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1
LAND REFORM AND THE AGRICULTURAL INCOME DISTRIBUTION 
This paper discusses some of the technical aspects of land reform with 
a view to better understanding its possible impact on income distribution, 
the main goal in many cases of land reform. The model used is designed to 
capture the main relevant features of LDC agricultural sectors, i.e. the 
different factor proportions typically characterizing farms of different 
sizes, different crop compositions and different home consumption ratios. It 
is argued that, while land redistribution may be expected to raise agricultural 
output in many cases, it may well worsen the distribution of income by lower­
ing the demand for hired labor. The paper attempts to trace out the conditions 
under which this result would occur. There seems to have been a relative ne-
glect in discussions of agrarian reform of the theoretical possibility and 
empirical evidence that certain types of reform may lead to a worsening of 
d • t .b • 
2 to provide a general discussion of land1.s ri ution. No attempt is made 
reform, 3 so we come to no conclusion as to how frequent this phenomenon is likely 
to be. 
To simplify. we assume an agricultural population made up of three distinct 
1I am indebted to Benjamin Cohen and Herman Daly for useful comments on an 
earlier draft of this paper. 
2on the empirical side, the hypothesis has been put forward that the land re­
forms in several countries have lowered the wages of landless agricultural 
workers, and possibly worsened distribution in general. See for example, with 
respect to Chile, William Thiesenhusen, "Population Growth and Agricultural 
Employment in Latin America with some u. s. Comparisons", Land Tenure Center, 
University of Wisconsin mimeo, Feb., 1969. 
3Thus such dynamic questions as the positive or negative impact on i~vestment 
as a result of changes in the security of tenure for various groups, changes 
in average savings rates, and the creation of a rural middle-class which may 
lead to a better government and stronger community organizations are all dis­
regarded. So is the all important political side which inevitably makes or 
breaks agrarian reforms by determining whether or not they can be more than 
taken size operations . 
./ 
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groups--large landowners, small farmers (either owners or renters), and 
landless farmers. The analysis is directed primarily at the effects of various 
types and degrees of reform on the incomes of the landless workers and the 
small farmers. To do so it is necessary also to consider the output effects 
of the reform. 
Land Reform in the Context of Perfect Markets 
As a point in reference it should be remembered that with perfect markets 
for products and factors, and with constant returns to scale, factor proportions 
1
would be the same on large farms and small. In fact, as long as there were 
no economies of scale, a perfect market for land would not be a necessary 
condition for this result - perfect markets for capital, labor, and management 
2
would suffice; non-economic preferences by people to hold land and to farm 
their own land would not lead to inefficiencies or different modes of production 
(as long as there was no preference not to use the land in production). Land 
reform, by which would be meant simply the transferrence of ownership of land 
from one person to another, would imply the transferrence of capital and income 
from one person to another, therefore making the· distribution of income from cap­
ital and hence overall income distribution more equal. Nothing more. Despite its 
unrealism, it may be useful to bear this case in mind to better understand the 
subsequent ones. 
1The presence of economies of scale in some crops would lead to larger farms 
specializing in them; the larger farms would as a result have different overall 
factor proportions from the smaller ones. For a given crop grown on both large 
and small farms no difference in proportions would occur. 
2In the presence of economies of scale, and with a perfect land market, land 
would be rented in such a way as to be always operated in units of the optimal 
size. 
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Land Reform With An Imperfect Labor Market 
In the context of a more realistic imperfect labor market model, the 
danger arises that even a well intentioned reform may lower the welfare of 
a possibly substantial group of people already at the bottom of the income 
distribution. To illustrate this possibility in a simple framework, we assume 
that there are two types of farms--large ones and small ones; both are owner-
operated and they have access to the same technologies; we assume first that 
all farms produce the same crop. A third group, landless farmers,
1 work on 
the large farms; the small operators and their families are assumed also to 
contribute to the labor force on the large farms. We do not discuss in detail 
the labor market mechanism by which the wage rate is set; as long as there 
is a relation (in the usual direction) between the demand for labor, the supply 
2
from small farms, and the wage rate , the general nature of our arguments is 
not altered. 
In the pre-reform situation the large scale farmers earn, of course, the 
highest incomes, the small farmers lower ones, and the landless farmers the 
lowest of all. Land redistribution involves taking land from the large farmers 
and giving it either to the small farmers or the landless workers. 
\Je assume here that the family is the relevant economic entity, so a man 
would not be considered as landless if his father had land, as long as they 
were part of the same consumption unit. 
Even if the wage rate has an institutionally defined minimum so that the 
pressures which would otherwise push it down lead to unemployment instead, the 
relevance of the analysis is unchanged. 
2
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In what follows we first outline in a qualitative sense the conditions 
under which some important subgroup of the population may be rendered worse off 
by the redistribution (after trying to include in the model the key features of 
the differences between small and large farms - with the exception of their 
different product composition); we then specify in a more quantative way the 
effects of certain variables (e.g. the amount of land redistributed) on changes 
in the income distribution; finally we present a more general equilibrium frame­
work within which we rela~c the one-crop assumption and focus on the effects of 
expertal price changes on rural subgroups and the urban poor. The possibility 
of a fall in the incomes of the landless farmers (which are based solely on 
1
wages) is most obvious when the redistributed land goes to the small farmers 
and their demand for hired workers is less, per unit of land, than was that of 
the large scale farmers. In such a case the demand curve for hired labor 
2shifts to the left and the wage rate falls, the fall being greater the less 
elastic the supply curve, i.e. the greater the difficulties the landless 
workers face in moving to some other sector. The redistribution of income is 
thus in,favor of the small owners, and against the large landholders and wage 
earners. The greater the amount of land redistributed in this way, the greater 
1 /Frequently the people chosen to receive land are from the small farm sector; 
there is too little land to occupy everyone and to provide adequate incomes 
on the farms from which they come, and this group has some managerial exper­
ience, which may not be true of the laborers. Many political systems also 
favor this result since the small farmers are higher in the social structure 
and therefore more capable of mak:i.ng demands than the landless workers. 
21£ the marginal product of labor on the typical small farm is zero, for example, 
then an addit.ion to t;he land operated by the family, up to the amount for 
which t!}~ mat'girtaf prbduc,t of: labor equalled the market wage level, would not 
lead 
I 
td''the).r 'h.:f;ring .cn1.·•no1;1::,raiiiJ,,:LY.},@,~9F ,9;~ ~}J.· 
We dis;euss below the possi'bi.lity-t'fiat the' ·small farm families may withdraw 
some of thd.;r memberro from the labor market. ··•· 
•. r ;_ 
.. -~ . ' 
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1
the decrease in the average wage of the landless farmer. If, under the same 
circumstances, the land goes to the laborers rather than to the small farmers, 
the distributional effect is clearly more favorable (abstracting from the 
possibility that the worker's lack of managerial talents may be so extreme as 
to prevent him from achieving an income equal to or above the wage rate). If 
the land each of these laborers received was equal to the land he (in effect) 
worked on before, then non-recipients would not be any worse off than before; 
if the parcels were larger, however, the same sort of negative effect as just 
discussed would come into play. 
To get an idea of how probable it is that worker's incomes be lowered by 
land redistribution and the specific conditions leading to this result, it 
is necessary to make the model more realistic, in particular by dropping the 
assumption that large and small farmers operate in the same way, i.e. use the 
same amount of labor per acre and produce the same amount of output per acre. 
It is almost universally true that more labor is expended per acre on small 
units and more output is produced. t These relationships raise the possibility 
that a lowering of incomes of landless labor may not follow from a reform which 
gives the land to the small farmers. 
Consider once again the case where land is parcelled to the small cul­
tivators, who previously were small owners, tenants, or sqatters (our results 
are not altered significantly by their previous tenure status). The impact of 
the land transfer on the wage rate will depend on whether the sum of labor hired 
by the new operator plus the amount that his family withdraws from the labor 
1 ne abstract in this discussion from the question of seasonality of labor demand 
which,. with respect to the issue at. hand, complicates the analysis without al­
tering the conclusions. 
2
To my knowledge no country for which such calculations have been made is an 
exception; probably some regions with unusual characteristics are. 
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market is greater or less than the quantity previously hired on the large 
farms, all on a per acre basis. If it is greater the welfare of the wage­
earner will rise; if it is less a fall will result. Clearly the more surplus 
labor there was in the small farm sector before the reform the less likely it 
is that this new owner will hire labor. He may however decrease the supply 
of his labor to large farms. 
Suppose the typical subsistence farm before the reform can be represented 
as in Figure 1 by the marginal product of labor curve TL and the total amount3 
of family labor potentially available for use on the farm itself, ot2. The 
relationship between the marginal product of labor curve on the original small 
farm and the amount of labor which is employed off that farm is described in 
Figure 1 by what we will call the "supply price of labor" curve. It gives the 
wage at which the marginal individual would work off the farm as a function of 
the number of people on the farm. (The ordinary supply curve of labor from 
the farm is the mirror image of this curve, i.e. it has the vertical line at 
L2 as axis and increasing supplies are read off to the left of this origi
n). 
The wage figure used is assumed to be an 110n the farm equivalent, " i.e. if the 
man has special transportation or other costs associated with working off the 
family farm, this price is net of those costs. The curve SS 1, as drawn in 
Figure 1, reflects the assumption that farmers have a general preference, other 
things being equal, to work their own land so that the supply price of their 
labor off the farm is greater than its marginal productivity on their own farm. 
One would expect this relationship for two reasons: first, most people simply 
- 7 -
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prefer to work on their own land; second, someone who does not work his land 
has to rent it out and land market ·imperfections are likely to prevent his 
rate of return he could attain by farming him­receiving a rent equal to the 
self, partly due to his own extra familiarity with and interest in his land. 
The relationship suggested may be less true for a man's children, brothers, 
etc. than for himself, so whether the part of the supply price curve farther 
to the right is as shown here may be more in doubt. 
1 The position of the 
curve corresponding to th.ose workers for whom the marginal productivity of 
labor on the farm is below the current wage rate is a much discussed question 
involving the nature of family decision making, psychology, etc. There is no 
question that the empirical evidence from many countries indicates that 
people work on their own land for marginal returns below the going wage rate. 
Hhether (or to what extent) this is due to (a) a failure to maximize family 
earnings, (b) transportation or other added costs involved in working off the 
family farm or (c) the fact that the wage rate does not indicate the price 
at which another person could if he wished obtain employment is not yet clear. 
Even if the marginal members of the farm household (i.e. non-managers) could 
not add to the farm's output, there are reasons to doubt that their supply 
price would approach zero. 
2 
For example, women and children who do work on t.he 
1
The difference in supply price to non-agricultural pursuits between owner and 
other members of the family -- a rather related difference -- has been estimated 
for Japan by Masui. (See Yukio Masui, "The Supply Price of Labor: Farm Family 
Workers" in Kazushi Ohkawa, Bruce F- Johnston and Hiromitsu Kaneda, editors, 
Agriculture and Economic Growth: Japan's Experience, Princeton University 
Press and University of Tokyo Press, 1970). 
2
The desire to work one's own land and comparative advantage in doing so would 
presumably be less for this group than for the operator. 
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farm would often not work elsewhere for institutional reasons. Sometimes 
(e.g. Japan) women and children completely manage the home plot while men 
work in towns; this possibility depends, of course, on the nature of the work 
on the farm. Further, to the extent that the decision to work outside is 
more an individual than a family one, - e.g. where the individual who works 
elsewhere does not receive much or any support from the family• workers may 
not leave unless their income would be as great as or greater than they are 
receiving on the farm itself; this level may normally be expected to lie be­
tween subsistence and the average income per capita on that farm. Although on 
balance these factors suggest that the supply curve to the right of L3 
would 
be above zero even if marginal productivity were not, it seems also reasonable 
to assume that it will be sloping downward toward the horizontal axis, since 
whatever reasons impede people from working on other farms are likely to be 
1 
less and less influential as the number of people on the small plot rises. 
Since the costs of communication, transportation, being away from home, 
etc. presumably create a gap between the supply price the person would require 
if he could work on his own farm and the supply price he would have to receive 
to work elsewhere, the evidence that people work on their own land for returns 
below the wage rate is not conclusive proof that their supply price as defined 
1The argument, implicit or explicit in various labor surplus models, that 
people will work elsewhere only when the wage rate equals the average product­
ivity on the family farm would lead to this result since this average product­
ivity is a declining function of the number of family members on the given area. 
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in SS' of Figure 1 is below the wage rate. This gap depends on the case; 
when large farms and small farms are in a symbiotic relationship, and especially 
when the land which constitutes the small farm was made available by the large 
landowner precisely with a view to tying down what is basically hired labor1, 
it may not be present. But looking at a country as a whole, it need only be 
present in some cases for its presence to explain part of the use of low 
productivity labor on own farms. For the moment we assume that this differential 
is a constant, i.e. does not depend on the extent of surplus labor on a given 
farm or on other variables included in the discussion; adding the constant to 
the SS' curve gives us a new higher supply pr:i.ce curve (s1s ') indicating the1 
wage which would have to be actually paid to get family members to work else­
where. Thus the number of people from the representative farm described by 
Figure 1 who would wish to work elsewhere for a wage of OW 
0 
is L4L2. This 
would leave OL4 wo
rking on the farm itself. 
2 
When the small scale farmer becomes the operator of a larger farm he 
must reconsider how much family labor should be used on the farm
3, whether some 
1A fairly typical relation in several Latin countries, e.g., Colombia. 
2we abstract here from the problems associated with the fact that the farmer 
will frequently not be receiving more land contiguous with that which he had 
before but rather a separate plot. If, on receiving the new plot, he gives 
up the land he was on before, then it will probably go to small farmers who 
have not received land in the reform, thus making them better off. Or labor­
ers, whose wages are forced down by the re form, may get it. This last result 
is the most favorable to the previously landless workers, and could alter the 
results presented in the text. 
3or he and the individual family members must each make their own decisions, if 
that is the way things are done. 
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should work elsewhere, and whether any outside labor needs to be hired. 
Suppose, as an illustration, that the new larger farm has the marginal product 
of labor curve RL of Figure 1. There is now a new supply price of labor curve8 
(giving the supply price to the hiring farm, i.e. replacing the previous curve, 
s s 1 ) for this family; we assume here that the relationship of the new one,
1 1 
S S ' to the new MPL curve is the same as the original relationship between 
r r ' 
the same two curves; in terms of Figure 1, the reform would lead to a fall in 
labor supply to the larger farms from L L2 to L L2. The impact of this land4 5 
transfer on the landless farmers will be positive if the difference L4L2 - L L5 2 
is greater than the amount of labor previously hired and applied to the trans­
ferred land. If the extent of surplus labor on the small farm had originally 
been less, the family would now supply nothing to the labor market, and if the 
labor available had been less than 016, it would now be hiring. 
As long as the small operator who receives more land either withdraws 
some family labor from other farms or hires some labor himself, there is the 
possibility that the equilibrium wage rate will not fall. One factor likely 
to work in this direction is the difference in technology and crop composition 
between large and small farms; as mentioned above, small farms tend to use more 
1labor intensive technologies and produce more per unit of land than large ones. 
1This difference depends on differences in the sort of product produced, the 
extent of absenteeism on the large farms with corresponding managerial in­
efficiency, economies of scale, and a series of other factors. For an inter­
esting interpretation of the difference see John w. Mellor, "Family Labor in 
Agricultural Development" Journal of Farm Economies, Vol. 45, No. 3, August, 
1963. An interesting discussion is also found in Peter Dorner "Land Tenure, 
Income Distribution and Productivity Interactions" Land Economics, Vol. 40, 
August, 1964. 
'' 
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The situation on any given acre may be represented as in Figure 2, where the 
marginal product of labor curve corresponding to an acre on the large farm 
is below and steeper than that of the smaller farm. 
1 
With a wage of OW the 
0 
large farm would use OL of labor per acre and the small farm would use OL1. 0 
Whether the landless farmers are hurt or not depends, as noted above, 
on whether the increase in total labor use (on all farms together) as a re­
less than the increasedsult of the transfer of this unit of land is greater or 
use of labor of the family which receives the land (on their own and other 
people's land). One might guess that the apparently negative effects of 
land reforms on real wages have resulted from a substantial surplus ofsome 
labor on the small farms
1 and a tendency for the supply price of labor to 
other farms to be well above the marginal productivity on the home farm for 
smaller numbers of workers but less so for larger ones. This might be the 
if, for example, the gap for the first few workers resulted from the farm-case 
1For our purposes it is not necessary to make precise the reason why small 
farms usually produce more output per acre than large ones. It could be, for 
onexample, that the MPL curve is not really lower the large farm (given the 
context of its operation) but that the major factor is that it hires labor only 
to the point, (or perhaps short of it) where its marginal productivity equals 
the wage rate, while the small farm goes beyond it. We chose the representa-
tion of Figure 2 because much impressionistic evidence suggests that the large 
farm frequently does not have available to it the labor-intensive alternatives 
used by the smaller farm, perhaps because of organizational problems which 
would go with those alternatives, or perhaps because they are especially 
suitable to products which do not have big markets (and when produced on the 
small farm are also consumed there). 
Note that there may be a tendency to favor households with large families 
as recipients of land, on grounds of need. This will work to the disadvantage 
of the landless workers, as pointed out to me by Herman Daly. 
2 
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er's preference to work on his own land and the difficulties for his wife 
and some of his children elsewhere, while there were fewer problems in having 
his grown sons work elsewhere. Given this situation, it is possible that 
the supply of labor to other farms would not decrease much when the change of 
farm size occurs. In the perhaps extreme case where the labor he was applying 
to his smaller farm satisfies his needs for labor on the new larger farm, then 
his family will continue to supply as much labor to the large scale farm sec­
tor as before. On the other hand, few reforms are such that the land recipient 
need hire many non-family workers in his new situation. Thus any positive 
impact on the income of the landless farmer must work through a decrease in 
the total labor supply to the large farms via withdrawal of family labor from 
that market. 
The final impact on the landless farmers can be either positive or nega­
tive. The greater the surplus labor on the small farms before the redistribu­
tion, the less the mobility of landless workers out of agriculture, and the 
less the difference in labor applied per unit of land between small and large 
farms, the greater is the chance that wage rate will fall. Another relevant 
variable is the size of the unit in which the farms are given out; we consider 
it in more detail presently. 
To summarize: in the model just discussed, redistribution increases total 
output, decreases the income of the high income group, increases that of the 
middle income group, (because some families have more land, and possibly 
also because some of the land they were working on before may have gone to other 
- 15 -
small farmers), and may either lower or raise that of the landless farmers. 
The danger of a negative impact on a substantial number of people is, of 
course, less when the redistribution is to previously landless farmers. Prob­
ably the major danger here would be a distribution in units larger than the 
amount the representative laborer worked on before the refo.rm. This could 
make non-recipients worse off, as we see in more detail below. 
Income Effects on Landless Workers as a Function of the Si.ze of Plot. 
In both of the two simple models discussed above, the impact of the amount 
of land distribution, given the size of parcel handed out, is fairly straight­
forw~rd. The way in which the results depend on the size of plot distributed 
is less obvious; we turn now to that question. 
Consider first a simple "benchmark" case where only small farmers receive 
land, and each receives the same amount of land, and that amount is such that 
the large landowners are left with none (or alternatively each is left ~ith 
this new standard parcel); i.e. if there are n small cultivators each one 
receives 1/n of the total land taken from the large landholders. · I~ having re• 
ceived that amount of land each farmer wished at the existing wage rate to hire 
a smaller amount of outside labor per acre than was previously used the reform 
would lead to a lower equilibrium wage. Meanwhile the high incomes of the 
ex-large landowners have disappeared and the small farmers are better off 
than before. And if the small farms use sufficiently more labor than the large 
ones so that they also hire more, the equilibrium wage rises. If the redis­
tribution were incomp~ete, the wage rate would change in the directions just 
- 16 -
indicated but not as far. 
Note that if the size of the plots handed out is larger than A/n (where 
A is the total land expropriated from large farmers) not all of the small 
farmers get more land. It is clear that where all land is parcelled out the 
equilibrium wage rate would not be positive unless the typical new plot were 
large enough so that the marginal productivity of the amount of family labor 
1available were positive. For larger plots than this, the decrease in the 
wage rate would be smaller the larger the plots as long as the labor used per 
acre is not a decreasing function of farm size, Le. as long as MPL on the new 
plots is a function only of the labor/land ratio and not of their size. With 
this assumption the possibility arises that if the parcelling out occurs in 
large enough plots the wage rate will actually increase in a situation where 
distribution in small plots would have led to a decrease. No generalizations 
are possible, since the issue involves the effect of the land reform on the mar-
ginal product of labor curve, something we know little about; 2 most likely, 
1Ee abstract here from both the possibility that a positive disutility of work 
would lead the family to hire labor although physically it could supply enough 
to lower the marginal productivity to zero, and the possibility that family 
members will migrate to other sectors of the economy when the agricultural wage 
rate gets low enough. Both can be easily allowed for. 
2
In part the question is whether the position of this curve is more a function 
of the size of the farm itself, or of the origin of the person doing the managing. 
The marginal productivity of labor curve may be higher after the reform because 
the large scale operators did not know anything about agriculture, and/or were 
absentees, or because they could not oversee an intensive agricultural oparation. 
The ex-small farmers may be able to oversee a more substantial operation espec­
ially when the basic issue is whether a person is on the farm or not. On the 
other hand, to the extent that the tendency to use much labor and achieve very 
high output per acre results from high need, when the previously subsistence 
farmer has a substantial amount of land he may not be prepared to oversee enough 
labor to get the same yields per acre as he had on the smaller plot. 
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though, the beneficiary will produce somewhat more per acre than the large 
farmer but will find it convenient to substitute capital for labor, and hence 
will not have as high a man/land ratio after the reform as before. The latter 
effect may be immediate, especially if the reform makes capital available along 
with the land, or gradual if the farmer must accumulate it himself. If the 
effect is strong, it is improbable that any land redistribution which would 
not raise the wage rate in the case of equal distribution of all the land among 
these ex-small owners would do so if the parcels were larger. 
The relation between plot size and changes in the wage rate is complex. 
For example, it is possible trat distribution in small plots would lower the 
wage rate, distribution in medium sized plots would raise it, and distribution 
in still larger ones would lower it. (The second dividing line would be 
related to the systematic application of machinery and similar labor saving 
devices). Figure 3 illustrates this possibility and presents a simple graphic 
method of describing a variety of cases. Size of new farm and labor input 
are measured, respectively, on the horizontal and vertical axes. A fixed labor 
(all hired) to land ratio is assumed for the large farms, so total labor applied 
is a linear function of the number of acres (curve OL). OF and OA represent, 
respectively, total and family labor applied on small farms as a function of 
size. The concavity of curve OF reflects the assumption that the labor/land 
ratio is a decreasing function of size. Oa is the total amount of family 
labor avilable, all of which is applied to the home farm when its size is equal 
to or above Ob <1Creas. Oc is the amount of family labor originally supplied 
to large farms an1 the curve OR p~esents the relation between this amount and 
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the new farm size. Hhen this size reaches Od acres, no labor is being supplied 
off the farm. The curve ON shows, as a function of the size of new farm, the 
net impact of the land transfer on the demand for the services of landless 
workers; that impact is given by the labor demand of the new farm (OF-OA) plus 
the labor removed from the market by the small farm families (OR) minus the 
decreased demand of large farms (OL). As suggested above, many factors go 
into the determination of the relationships pictured in Figure 3; some of these 
have been mentioned but many more would have to be taken into atcount for a 
complete picture. 
The above discussion can be applied with straightforward modifications to 
the situation where the redistributed land goes to landless farmers; it remains 
probable that, if average plot size is above A/n, a lowering of the wage rate 
fo'.i:' those still in the labo:c market will occur. Hhere redistribution is 
partly to small farmers and ?artly to wage earners the analysis is not much 
. 1 
complicated. If there is a tendency for small farmers to receive land first, 
then the early stages of the reform may lower the welfare of the landless 
workers, but when they start to receive land their situation will, of course, 
be improved. 
1
The impact on the wage rate will depend on the proportions in which they are 
chosen, partly since, other things being equal, the wage rate effect of re­
distribution will be more positive when the landless farmers get the land, 
but also because these two groups may differ fairly systematically in the amount 
of hired labor they use on their new plots. 
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Land Reform in a More General Equilibrium Context: Changes in Crop Composition 
and in the Marketed Surplus 
The potentially negative effect (on landless workers) of land reform 
discussed above resulted from the impact of the reform on the demand for 
labor in the agricultural sector; since the analysis was partial, it remains 
to ask whether this effect might be offset by indirect but positive ones 
(e.g. a migration of this group to urban occupations without loss of income) 
or accentuated by other negative effects. 
He have so far implicitly assumed that any differences in the composition 
of output by size of farm are not important for the analysis; we now modify 
that assumption to take account of the well-known facts that small farms nor­
mally have a higher share of their output in crops for Mame consumption and 
specialize in somewhat different crops than do large farms. As a result of 
the first characteristic situations can arise in which the marketed surpluc; 
(quantity of products sold to the rest of the economy) decreases although total 
output rises. Whether this happens depends, among other things, on the land 
recipients' income elasticity of demand for food; if output were to stay con­
stant it would be almost certain that the marketed surplus would decrease; since 
output may be expected to increase under most circumstances, the effect on the 
marketable su ·plus is unpredictable. 
If the reform leads to a change in total marketable surplus, some prices 
must change. If the surplus increases, one effect will be a negative impact 
on small farmers who have not received land but who sell produce competitive 
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with that of the reform benefic.iaries. Price declines may even mean that the 
recipients of the land themselves will benefit little or not at all, (theor­
etically they could lose
1); in general their gains are likely to be less than 
expected. The income effects of the reform, and their relation to its ex­
tent, will thus be much less simple than suggested by the partial analysis 
on 
either lessened or increased via the production impact of the reform. A low­
presented above. 
2 Any direct negative impact the landless workers may be 
er monetary wage is not inconsistent with a higher real wage for those whose 
consumption bundle involves basic food products whose prices have fallen. 
Perhaps the major relevance of the size of the marketed surplus lies in 
aits role as a determinant of the real income of the poorer urban groups; 
decrease in the surplus would have a negative impact on the urban poor and be 
associated with a positive effect on the rural poor. If we assume that these 
are distinct groups, the net welfare effect of the decrease in surplus could 
be ambiguous. Since there may be substantial migration from one group to the 
other, this assumption might not be a good one. Although a decrease in marketed 
1This would occur if the elasticity of demand for the crops was sufficiently 
below one to offset the fact that some of the increased output benefits the 
farm family directly via home consumption, this positive effect being greater 
the greater is the price elasticity of demand for these goods by the family 
itself. 
2
For exanple, there might be a level of the reform for which prices would 
not fall significantly and for which the major impact is the positive one 
on the recipients of the new land; with further redistribution the recipients 
as a whole might be better off than before but those who have not received 
more land worse off; finally even the group of land recipients as a whole may 
be worse off than before. 
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surplus due to land redistribution is mentioned frequently in the literature 
(as a theory based prediction), the sort of decrease which would harm the 
urban poor is less likely. As noted above, a change in composition of 
output is likely to accompany the change in land distribution, since small 
farmers produce more subsistence type crops for home consumption; apart from 
this; there may also be a systematic difference in the type of crop sold. 
Large farms tend to concentrate on "commercial" crops, while small farms often 
produce most of the food products, especially those entering heavily in the 
diet of the urban poor. 
1 It would seem likely that the composition of the 
marketed surplus of the small farm would at least correspond~ to the 
composition of demand of the low income urban dweller than would the marketed 
surplus of the large farm.· Under this circumstance the urban poor might 
become better off in the face of a decrease in the marketed surplus since the 
prices of the food items they consume could fall. A further aspect of the 
phenomenon is that when the cost of food falls in the urban areas, the real 
wage employers can pay in terms of industrial goods goes down, so the employ­
ment outlook there may improve and some of the direct or indirect beneficiaries 
may be lower income people from the rural areas. If such an effect is important, 
then a full analysis is sure to become quite complicated, and a very "general 
equilibrium" understanding is necessary before one can predict the final im­
pact even on this group. 
1 . . . rice, sugar,In Colombia, for example, the large farms concentrate on cotton, 
etc. and 'the small ones on potatoes, yuca, corn, and the like. 
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Conclusions 
In the context of a simple three group models (large farmers, small farmers, 
landless farmers) we have outlined some of the determinants of how land re­
distribution may be expected to affect income distribution - in particular how 
it will affect the incomes of landless workers (through the agricultural wage 
rate), and of the land recipients. The fact that a wage decrease is a 
definite theoretical possibility(and which a number of observers believe has 
occurred in certain countries) suggests a need, in the design of reforms, for 
more careful thinking about distribution implications. Otherwise, given the 
all too numerous biases of any system against improvements in distribution, it 
may be expected that a series of reforms will go awry for "technical II reasons, 
to match the series which go awry for political reasons. This may leave few 
successes. 
Indirect effects, both positive and negative, need also be analyzed, es­
pecially those related to the price of marketed products. No generalizations 
emerge from their consideration, but rather the need for much information about 
an individual case before predicting the overall impact of a reform. 
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